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President Clinton’s Heideggerian Moment
Wed, March 29, 2006 - 1:34 AMNow, logicians distinguish three "modes" of the word “is”: the existential, the predicative, and the “is” of identity. One can say of something that it is in the sense that it exists, such as when the believer asserts that “God is” (existential). Or one can say of something that it possesses a certain property, as when the geologist states that a particular rock is reddish, light, and porous (predicative). Finally, one can say of something that it is the same as x, as when the astronomer says that Venus is the morning star or Lois Lane says that Clark Kent is Superman (identity).
But these distinctions are not what Clinton had in mind. He was concerned with the grammar of “is,” specifically its indication of the present tense and the fact that since, by the time he made his statements about Lewinsky, their sexual relationship had ended, what he said, given that it referred to the present, was strictly true. Clearly, Clinton did not say: “There was no improper relationship.” He even went so far as to implicitly admit that “if 'is' means is and never has been,” then he had lied. But, of course, as a matter of grammar, “is” doesn’t behave that way. Whether considered as simple present, active or passive, or present progressive, active or passive, Clinton’s denial that there “is” an improper relationship was, when he issued it, by all accounts true.
Even though what mattered to Clinton, so far as “is” was concerned, was grammar not modality, it’s nonetheless worth noting that the mode of “is” in question was existential. The issue was whether a sexual relationship between Lewinsky and Clinton is, whether such a relationship exists or is non-existent and by extension the question of what it means that things are, that there is something rather than nothing. And that is precisely the question that Heidegger attempts to re-assert beginning with "Sein und Zeit" (1927): the question of the meaning of being, the significance of the fact, which is more than one fact among others, that quite apart from their properties and identities, their characteristics and behavior, their origins, causes, effects, and purposes, their structures and functions, things just are.
True, Clinton raised the issue in a regrettably tawdry context, and neglected to develop it very far, but he did raise it. It is to be hoped that, among the projects of Clinton’s presidential library, some consideration is being given to furthering his legacy as a thinker of the relationship between being, or isness, and language by supporting further inquiry into these questions.
Wed, March 29, 2006 - 1:34 AM -
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Wed, March 29, 2006 - 10:29 PM
More recently, Matt Gonzalez popularized among San Franciscans the tautological self-evidence of is-ness with his recurrent use of the phrase "It is what it is."
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Thu, March 30, 2006 - 2:26 PM
What would save such a statement from tautology is intending different meanings of "is" in each case. Perhaps that's even true of Gonzalez's statement if the first "is" is existential and the second predicative (even though the predicate is unstated). In Michael Cimino's "The Deer Hunter" (1978), Robert De Niro's character holds up a bullet and famously says: "This is this." It's the tautological sublime, the best instance of it in the movies that I know of....
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Mon, April 3, 2006 - 10:04 PM
and it also showed sloppy, no pun intended, questioning by the interrogator, for not following up on and difinitively defining the relationship from the beginning to the present date...
thats fairly standard practice in the legal world when they really want to know the answer |
